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support of official creditors. The underlying  tinue doing business there; others want to cut
premise of those adopting the Brady Plan is that  their losses and exit.) What about a bank's
the existing stock of debt can never be fully  fiduciary responsibility to its depositors and
serviced, even though the country has embarked  shareholds?
on a far-reaching  adjustment  program.
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To date, only a handful of countries (Costa  such as holders of its sovereign bonds, or other
Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela) have  governments or multilateral agencies? Will or
successfully concluded their debt reduction  should commercial banks be the only ones to
negotiations through a Brady Plan with commer-  offer relief by t?king  losses?
cial creditors. Others, such as the Philippines,
have engaged in Brady-type deb. reduction for  *  What is the country's proposed strategy for
part of their outstanding commercial debt.  seeking future financing from private sources,
director foreign investment, and international
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reduction and debt rescheduling? What consider-
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Menu Approach,  CFS Informal  Financial  Note  #1, September  1988I.  Irucn
The purpose of  this  note  is to  illustrate the  principles involved  in  the
restructuring of a country's outstanding obligations to commercial banks.  Banks'
attitudes towards the treatment of troubled loans have evolved considerably since
the inception of the debt crisis.  A pragmatic approach to debt restructuring which
combines the relatively recent feature of debt and debt service reduction (DDSi)
and the support  of official creditors  is commonly  refefred to as the "Brady Plan".  1 To
date only a handful of countries (Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela  and Uruguay) have
successfully concluded their debt reduction negotiations  through a Brady Plan with
commercial  creditors.  Others, such as the Philippines, have engaged in Brady-type
debt reduction  for a portion of their outstanding  commercial  debt.
II. The Baker Approach
From 1982 to 1989, banks attempted to offer relief to debtors on a case-by-
case basis using reschrdulings  and so-called concerted  new money operations. The
initial stage of the concerted lending approach  reflected the perception that the debt
servicing difficulty was a temporary phenomenon,  giving rise to the need to "buy
time".  Indicators of indebtedness were rising because real interest rates on na  st
debt exceeded the economy's  real growth rate.  The Baker approach, formally
adopted under the Baker Plan of October 1985 but in practice since 1982, was to
provide the necessary interim support to highly ind,-bted  countries so that export
and GNP growth could once again surpass real interest rates, and thereby restore
the country's ability to pay.  This was referred to as "growing  out of debt".
Support  from all of the country's creditors  was organized for fmancing  balance
of payments gaps with a view to  supporting the adjustment and growth process.
The debtor government  would
- accept a., IMF or World Bank adjustment  program,
- negotiate  rescheduling  of principal and interest repayments on official debt
contracted with the Paris Club before a specified  cutoff date, and
- negotiate  rescheduling  of all principal maturities falling due on commercial
debt within a specified period, and sometimes provide some new lending
(usually less than total interest payments due).
The stock of old debt was thus left intact and the repayment period was
extended, typically with a grace period during which only interest payments were
due on the entire outstanding balance.  In addition to rescheduling, commercial
1  In 1988  and 1989,  former Finance Minister Miyazawa of Japan, President Mitterand of
France and  US Treasury Secretary Brady made proposals to include debt and  debt
service reduction more formally in the debt management strategy and to promote some
form of official  support for such transactions.-2-
creditors agreed to maintain trade and interbank short-term credit lines at specified
minimum  levels.
Such  "concerted packages"  were becoming more  and more  difficult  to
assemble, however, as skepticism  grew in the commercial  banking community about
improved repayment prospects of the debtors.  The extensive set of contractual
provisions  such as  sharing  clauses,  negative pledge  and pari  passu  covenants  that
had initially been helpful in facilitating the cohesion of commercial banks, were no
longer sufficient  to maintain  solidarity.
In  response to  these increasing strains, a  market-based  menu  approach
began to emerge, recognizing the diverse interests and coastraints of creditors and
providing more flexibility.  The menu approach implicitly reflected the longer-term
framework that the debt crisis required, and was intended to provide countries with
both time and debt relief, including, in some cases a negotiated and market-based
reduction of debt obligations. New money  requests (e.g  Argentina in 1987, Brazil in
1988) included features that were aimed at encouraging a prompt response on the
part  of  commercial banks.  The  introduction of  such features  represented the
beginnings  of what is commonly  understood  to be the 'Brady-type" approach  today.
A number of restructuring and new money agreements in  1986-88 saw the
introduction  of diversified financial techniques  such as currency redenomination  and
interest rate switching options being offered by debtors to creditors.  Banl-s were
granted the option to redenominate the existing loans in their domestic currencies,
providing them with an asset management  technique  that could reduce funding risks,
mitigate the effect of exchange rate volatility on capital-asset ratios, and lower
funding costs in the case of non-US dollar based banks.  Currency redenomination
options exist in restructuring agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Nigeria,
Mexico, Philippines,  Venezuela,  Uruguay  and Yugoslavia.
Interest rate options p tvided creditors with alternative interest rate bases
to which a margin was added  - various eligible currencies.  Banks could choose
LIBOR, a domestic rate, or th-  .rime  -ate.  By lending at floating rates, creditors
were reducing or eliminating interest rate risk, but because that uncertainty was
passed on to  the borrower, the  interest rate risk reduction was achieved at the
expense of increasing  their own repayment  risk.  The weight of floating rate debt in
total liabilities was clearly an important destabilizing factor in  LDCs'  external
positions during periods of sharp fluctuation in interest rates.  Interest base options
were included in  debt restructuring agreements with Argentina, Chile, Mexico,
Nigeria, Philippines,  Uruguay  and Venezuela.
Most regional and small-exposure  banks, however, were striving to redirect
their lending towards traditional domestic and trade financing business, and some
were eager to leave the overseas lending process even at the cost of significant
write-downs of assets.  Net flows (disbursements  minus principal repayments) from
banks underwent a drastic contraction since 1984 and total net transfers (net flows
minus interest payments) have largely remained negative since the inception of the
debt  crisis.  By  any  measure,  the  relief  provided  to  debtors  through  the
"conventional approach" proved to be insufficient, and a number of countries after-3-
requesting repeated  reschedulings, found themselves  unable to  meet  even  the
interest  obligatid ;s.
Ill.  The Brady Initiative
The need for  commercial debt reduction  (or debt  service  reduction) is
recognized from the moment when both a country and its commercial creditors
conclude that the existing stock of debt can never be fully serviced, even though the
country has embarked on a far-reaching adjustment program.  The Brady Initiative
has  given official  blessing and  encourageme.it to  including  debt  reduction in
negotiations and  has offered  official sector  support.  The role  of  multilateral
institutions would be to provide partial financing for "enhancing" such commercial
debt reduction agreements.  This note explains further what happens when, in
response to a request by the country, the creditors agree to negotiate to reduce the
burden of outstanding commercial debt.  This  immediately raises  a number of
dilemmas for both the ccantry and the creditors, since the creditors are explicitly
agreeing to recognize some losses:
(i)  what is the limit to the "relief" a commercial  bank can offer?
(ii)  what is a "good deal" for the country?  the preferred mix between debt
reduction and debt rescheduling?  what considerations should the country
take into account?
(iii)  what is a "good deal" for the banks?  how do banks of various nationalities
reconcile their differing interests vis-a-vis the country?  Some expect to
continue doing business there, while others want to cut their losses and exit;
(iv)  what about other creditors of the country, such as holders of its sovereign
bonds, or  other governments, or multilateral agencies, etc?  Will/should
commercial  banks be the only ones to offer relief by taking losses?
(v)  what about a commercial  bank's fiduciary responsibility to its depositors and
shareholders?
(vi)  what is  the  country's  proposed strategy with  respect  to  seeking future
financing from private sources/direct  foreign investment/international  capital
markets? How will a debt reduction operation affect the country's access to
commercia/private  sector finance in the future?
(vi)  how much support  can be expected from multilateral  and bilateral institutions,
to finance a debt reduction  operation?
There are no readily available solutions to these questions.  For obvious
reasons there is  no established precedent to questions such as "how much debt
should be forgiven?"  All commercial  debt reduction is the result of a case-by-case
negotiated outcome.  However, a few general principles have been established as a
result  of experience accumulated to  date, and countries which are currently in-4-
discussions with their cu.nmercial creditors are attempting to approach the issue
based on these principles. The presentation  which follows is a condensed account  of
what  sas emerged from numerous iterations of proposals and cour erproposals
between a debtor country and its Bank Advisory Committee, until something could
be agreed on which reasonably satisfied both parties' interests.
IV.  Preconditions/Factors  Influencing  a Debt Reduction  Operation
1.  The country has embarked on  an adjustment program, but existing
claims are still acknowledged  to be partially irrecoverable
In spite of economic  reform measures  taken by the country  to improve,  among
other things its creditworthiness,  existing claims no longer look attractive because
the creditor recognizes that the probability of receiving full and timely payments of
interest  and  amortization  of  principal  is  low  and  falling  due  to  adverse
circumstances.  At the same time, creditors and debtors have a shared interest in
bringing about an improvement in the debtor's economic situation.  Before "losing
everything" the creditor has an incentive to negotiate a new set of legally binding
agreements that protects his claims as far as possible.  By lowering claims today
and giving the country a chance to benefit from adjustment, the creditor expects to
increase the chance of receiving the remaining contractual  payments, and to share in
the future gains  from policy  reform. 2
2.  There is activity in the secondary market  for claims on the country,
indicating  differing  expectations  regarding  the  probability  of  full  debt
repayment.
The  number  and  sizes  of  transactions  in  the  secondary  market  for
international bank loans are driven by economic and debt policy developments in
debtor countries.  These, together with banks  portfolio strategies and regulatory
regimes affect creditors' expectations on whether countries are able and willing to
service debt obligations.  Similar actions by other major banks have led  to  a
perceived surplus of LDC loans, causing prices (in cash and swap terms) to decline
in most cases.
Despite the great deal of attention that it has attracted, the overall size of
the secondary  market is still marginal compared with that of LDC external  debt.  The
market remains thin, and the number of countries whose debt is actively traded is
lirmited  to a handful  of debtors. The prices for LDC loans  are therefore  often notional,
and it could be misleading  to interpret them as being "voluntarily" applicable  to any
large scalc transaction.
2  All debt reduction agreements to date have also included explicit "recapture clauses".
These entitle participating creditors to increased repayments in future in the case of a
windfall  due  to  commodity price  increases  (e.g  in  the  Mexico and  Venezuela
agreements, creditors receive additional payouts if the oil price rises above a trigger
valthe).-5-
The  majority of  secondary  market  transactions  have  been  asset  trades
between commercial  banks.  These take the form of Rr  debt swaps (trades of LDC
loans without changing  the terms of payment) for portfolio  balancing  reasons, or debt
fr  cash swp.  Portfolio adjustments are aimed at consolidation, diversification,
liquidity and tax liabditiy reduction.  It is estimated that two-thirds of secondary
market transactions are done for the purpose of rearranging bank portfolios or for
accounting reasons.  Cash sales of debt, on the other hand, give small exposure
banks a way out of the debt rescheduling/new money process.  Small exposure
creditors  often respond to a situation  of protracted  debt servicing  difficulty  by simply
selling their future claims on a debtor in the secondary market for less than face
value.
3.  The secondary market  price as a benchmark
The bid/offer prices currently quoted in the secondary market are in some
sense a benchmark in indicating to a country the levels of losses that a few of its
creditors are willingly  accepting.
It is important  to note that in the following illustration of a debt for cash sale
at a discount in the secondary market there is no impact on the situation of debtor
country:
Total Outstanding  Commercial  Debt:  US$100  million
Creditor A's share:  US$10  million
Creditor A sells his entire exposure in the secondary market at 30% of face
value.
A buyer pays US$3 million to creditor A and becomes the new holder of a
US$10 million claim on the country.  (If there is no debt-equity conversion
program ongoing in the country, then the purchase may be driven by portfolio
balancing  or speculative  motives).
The country's outstanding  debt remains at:  US$100  million.
Creditor A took a loss of US$7 million and retired his exposure, but did not
enter into negotiations  with the country.
The country is not able to benefit from the fact that Creditor A is willing to
exchange his $10 million  claim for a cash payment of $3 million. If the country had
entered into the same deal instead of the buyer in the secondary market, it would
now have a debt outstanding  of $90 miliion.  However, reserves would be lower by
US$3  million.
There are legal clauses in existing loan agreements which prevent countries
from being able to directly capture the discounts in the secondary market price of
their debt.  The sharing clause in a typical syndicated  loan agreement, for example,
specifies  that a payment  made by the debtor to any member  of the syndicate must be-6-
shared on a prorata,  basis with all other members.  This poses a legal obstacle for
debtors to buy back their own obligations from an individual .;reditor. Waivers on
prepayment  provisions, sharing clauses and pari-passu clauses 'equal treatment for
all creditors) must first b-e  obtained from all other creditors.  This is a lengthy and
complex process when unde:taken independently  of a comprehensive  debt workout,
and may not be successful.
The  likelihood of  obtaining  the  waivers  will  be greatly  inf.uenced  by
expectations  of what creditors  can expect to gain by refusing to grant them. There is
clearly a tradeoff from the creditor's viewpoint: reserves may be used either to buy
back debt at a discount, or creditors may insist  that they be  used to continue
scheduled  debt  service.  There  are  also  conflicting  interests  between  banks
whenever the possibility of some exit is introduced. At such moments, there is the
greatest convergence of interest between .he country and the subset consisting of
its long-term creditors: both would like to see as much debt reduction through
buyback as possible, at the greatest possible discount.
In July 1987 Bolivia and its commercial  bank lenders  reached an agreement to
allow Bolivia to repurchase all or a portion of its bank debt.  Under the proposal, a
portion of  the principal and  unpaid interest was to  be reduced  by  a buyback
transaction, and the remaining debt was to  be restructured.  The creditor banks
insisted that the funding for the buyback had to come from additional, official donor
grant finance specifically earmarked for the repurchase of the debt at a substantial
discount. The IMF was willing to act as administrator  of the voluntary contributions
to a Trust Account. The indicative price of Bolivian debt was around 10-12%. On
March 18, 1988 Bolivian authorities announced that 53 of its creditor banks had
tendered  over US$335  million  of eligible debt, almost US$270  million  in exchange  for
cash and about US$65 million in exchange for investment bonds under the newly
established  debt conversion  program. This transaction required US$28 million from
the IMF Trust Account and extinguished forty percent of Bolivia's  commercial
indebtedness.
The net benefit from a debt repurchase stems from the difference between the
opportunity cost of using scarce foreign exchange for prepaying external obligations
and the resulting reduction in the country's external debt.  The cash flow benefit is
clearly maximized  if a third party finances the repurchase and subsequently  forgives
all of the debt 3.  The timing of a debt buyback scheme is crucial, in that it should
optimally take place when the discount on the debt is the greatest and does not yet
reflect expectations of  an improvement in  the country's  economic and financial
profile.
Provided the debt repurchase is strictly voluntary and does not affect the
country's  liquidity position, (i.e it is financed with grants) the lower contractual
value of remaining  bank debt would confer an indirect benefit on the banks retaining
their claims, by raising the probability  that tiheir  debt would be serviced in future.
3  Assuming  the money  would  not have  been  available  for other  uses.-7-
Any unilateral action by a country in trying to enforce a repurchase price that
is  not the  market-clearing one for a  given quantity of  debt  could damage t..e
country's  track record in the creditor community and be ultimateiy harmful if the
country hopes to receive  future lending from a subset of its creditors who may have a
long-term business  interest.  It  would  also  lower  the  counitry's  prospects  of
attracting direct foreign investn  or tapping new foreign private sector funding
sources in  future, leaving recourse to  only multilateral and bilateral assistance,
which would also be affected  negatively.
To summarize, therefore, the secondary market price is a less than perfect
indicator in estimating  the total amnount  of discount at which the country can hope to
retire all or most of its debt, for the following  reasons:
(i)  waivers  must be obtained from all creditors; these will probably only be
granted if it is perceived  that the debt repurchase  will be truly volzintary;
(ii)  the secondaiy market for most LDC debt is illiquid in the absence of a
debt-equity conversion program; only marginal transactions take place,
and the majority of creditors will not voluntarily relinquish their claims
at the market price;
(iii)  creditors are not homogeneous;  they evaluate their options differently;
(iv)  creditors are subject to differing tax and regulatory regimes in their
home countries and their long term expectations and intere~sts  in the
debtor country diverge. This affects the amount and form in  ,Vhich  they
may grant debt relief.
4.  Is there a debt-equity  conversion program?
A debt equity conversion program, whereby the country offers to repurchase
its external obligations using local assets can be a useful method for the country to
capture some of the prevailing discount in the secondary market.  In essence the
country invites  interested investors to  purchase its obligations for cash  in  the
secondary  market and to trade them in for a local security which is used for domestic
investment or the purchase of a domestic asset.  The terms at which the exchange
takes place (i.e the government repurchases its obligations from the investor who
has bought them) are subject to negotiations or an auction.  This is also a way of
promoting foreign investment through an implicit premium on the exchange rate,
while at the same time promoting competition  among interested  foreign investors.
However, the process described above may be inflationary if narrow money
supply  increases  for  repurchasing  public  sector  obligations  and  the  equity
investments actually take place in the domestic private sector.  If the same debt
equity conversion process is carried out in the context of a privatization  program
where the debt is exchanged for existing assets without the introduction of local
currency into the transaction, then there is little risk that monetary aggregates will
be affected (unless there is crowding out of domestic investors). Depending on how-8-
the transaction is carried out, the government may be able to directly  swap its
,iabilities to commercial  banks for its equity in an enterprise, i.e the right to share in
future profits of the enterprise. Following  this transaction, the government's debt is
reduced, and its only remaining "liability" consists of permitting the repatriation of
prefits after a suitable period.  (It is referred to as a liability here in the sense that
the govemment  must be willing to sell foreign  exchange to the investor at the official
rate  for the  purpose of  transferring earnings out  of  the  country).  The added
advantage to this is that such a liability is matched with the business cycle of the
domestic economy,  unlike the o'  deb, service obligations. When the economy does
well, higher profits are earned by the enterprise and the government is also in a
better position (regarding avai'ability of foreign exchange) to permit repatriation of
increased profits, and vice versa.
The budgetary  impact of a privatization  through debt equity conversion would
ha"e to be taken into account, comparing the amount of debt service obligations
cancelled with the amnount  of revenues  foregone from the enterprise. If the privatized
unit had previously been a loss-making one, there wouild  clearly be a net positive
budgetary  impact,  resulting  from both a reduction in subsidies  and in debt service.  -if
it is  widely expected that  the enterprise will be better managed under private
ownership (or if  the government has consented to regulatorv changes that will
increase profitability) then the government may be able to charge a higher price  a
(extinguish  more debt) in exchange for the enterprise. If an auction is used to price
the  enterprise, the  "improved  management premium" effect  is  expected to  be
reflected  in the winning  bid.
It  is  widely  observed  that  for  countries  with  attractik  e  investment
possibi.ities,  the  announcement of  such a program  leads to  an increase in  the
secondary  market price of debt.  The Chilean debt equity swap program, initiated in
May 1985, remains the largest, best established  and most flexible arrangment of any
developing country.  Mexico and Argentina have also reactivated their programs
recently, and have accomplished the successful privatization of important public
sector assets (telephone company, airlines) through this mechanism.  A number of
others, such as Nigeria, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, to name a
few, have also launched  conversion  programs.
5.  Are creditors  in  a position  to voluntarily grant relief/accept  losses?
Following  the  inception  of  the  debt  crisis  in  1982, creditor  governments
responded  by taking coordinated actions to protect the international  banking system.
Tax and regulatory  policie,  .sed to accomplish this  objective  took different  forrns,
but  banking  supervisors  in  all  countries  required  the  establishment  of  general
provisions  (loan loss reserves)  to cover possible  losses on doubtful loans.  The so-
called  Basle guidelines  have been drawn  up with  the purpose  of eliminating,  over
time, many of the inter-country  difference-  that exist in the regulatory  treatment of
4  However, in  practice loss-making entities are harder  to  sell through  debt equity
conversions unless these are accompanied by pcrmission to change policies such as
pricing, production, hiring, etc.-9-
loan loss reserves. Although not a part of the Basle agreement, regulators in all
major creditor countries have now specified lists of  troubled debtors and have
indicated mandatory minimum levels of provisions that banks must establish to
cover all  exposure to  these countries.  These mandated reserve levels vary by
creditor nationality, with the result  that some creditors could be a  little  better
provisioned  than others. This may have the effect of:
1)  lessening che urgency for such creditors to participate in a debt workout,
or
2)  ultimately allowing such creditors to grant greater concessions.
For example, a bank that has established  a high level of reserves in a country
where these are not considered a part of capital has effectively lowered its cost of
not participating in debt reduction/new  money packages.  Being well-reserved, the
bank can write down loans when arrears build up without affecting regulatory  capital
and without necessarily g-rnting concessions to the debtor.  A less well-reserved
bank, or a bank in a country where reserves are considered part of capital may
conclude that the costs of participating  in a debt workout/new  money package is less
than the cost of having to write down loans and reduce regulatory capital.  As a
result, the less well reserved bank might choose to lend new money while the well-
reserved bank might initially try to free ride, or prefer to exit if the exit price is
attractive.  In some countries provisions must immediately be established against
new money loans, thus reducing  the attractiveness  of this option for banks.
6.  Who are the country's  major creditors?
Many banks in the major creditor countries are currently operating at or near
the minimum capital-asset ratios  (adjusted risk asset ratios) mandated by  their
domestic banking supervisory authorities.  This is in spite of considerable balance
sheet restructuring  following the adjustment  of risk weights for LDC exposure in the
bank's portfolio  i.e selling some of the riskier assets and/or raising new capital.
The regulator" neatment of loan loss reserves therefore becomes crucial in two
areas:
(i)  the effect of such reserves on capital, and
(ii)  the tax treatment of such reserves.
A marginally capitalized bank is clearly at an advantage if it is permitted to
include its  general loan loss reserves as part of  its regulatory capital.  This is
permitted only in France, the US and to a limited extent in Japan.  However, once
losses are realized in the context of a debt reduction operation for such banks, an
upfront capital loss must be registered as the reserve is charged off.  It is to be
expected a prior,  therefore, that most French and US creditors who are otherwise
inadequately capitalized, will only be able to  accept debt exchange instruments
which protect the face or par value of their exposure  as far as possible.
The other  incentive  available  to  banks  to  establish  adequate loan  loss
reserves depends on  whether such reserves are tax deductible.  Here again, the-10-
creditors differ by  nationality.  German and French banks can deduct loan loss
provisions from taxable income, but US banks cannot.  For Japanese and UK banks,
tax  deductibility  is  limited  to  levels  below  the  actual  amount  of  provisions.
Favorable tax  treatment of provisions (as in  Germany and France) may reduce
incentives  for banks to  dispose  of  LDC  assets, either  through debt  reduction
operations or on the secondary market, since this would imply losing the source of
the tax deduction.
V. The Decision Faced by Banks: To exit or to lend new money?
Commercial banks express concern about  the issue  of "burden  sharing"
when it becomes obvious that a debtor is unable to service its obligations. 5 In
particular,  they are concerned that their  fellow creditors  should receive  equal
treatment  in  terms of  taking losses  on  existing exposure,  so  that no  creditor
emerges from the debt reduction in a more favorable  position than the others.
Commercial  banks value their debt differently  because of:
- differences in expectations  regarding the prospects of the debtor;
- different  business  interests/expertise/length  of  relationship  with  a
particulai debtor;
- different tax and regulatory  environments,  including level of ownership or
involvement  by their government;
- different loan-loss  reserve positions;
- different business strategies, e.g shift from loan to underwriting; from
LDC to Euromarket; from long-term lending to short-term trade finance
etc.
- desire to ircrease portfolio  diversification.
There are essentially three ways for an individual bank to respond when
confronted with a request  for debt reduction. It may
- choose to accept a loss upfront by accepting a cash payment or reduced
value asset from the debtor, which covers only a part of what it was
originally  owed,  or
- choose to lend new money to the debtor, some of which may be used to
repay the existing obligations,  or
5  As a prerequisite to eligibility for debt reduction, the debtor country itself is called
upon to adjust faster than it might otherwise have done, owing to the sharp reduction
in external finance.-11-
- do nothing.
The first  two options  pose a burden  on the creditor  since the history  of the
new money process has not been inspiring.  Most creditors in fact face an iinmediate
cost  if  they  choose  to  lend  new  money,  since  they  are  required  to  set  aside  a
provision  out of earnings,  for  loan losses on their  additional  exposure  on  the new
money.  The  third  option  has  regulatory  costs,  which  vary  according  to  the
nationality of the creditor.
VI.  The Free Rider Problem in the Context of a Commercial Debt Workout
Creditor  participation  is  the  most  crucial  element  for  any  successful
resolution  to  a country's  debt problem.  A successful  resolution  is defined  in this
case as a minimum of "free  ridc.ship"  on the part of commercial banks.  This tern
refers to the phenomenon whereby some banks refuse to choose any of the exchange
instruments  offered to them, but continue  to hold out for their original  claims  to be
serviced.  The  argument  is  that  once the  others  have chosen  one  or  more of  the
options and  have reduced their claims,  the country should be in a better position  to
service the free riders according to the original  agreements.6 Sharing and pari passu
clauses  in the loan agreement, which guarante  all creditors  a pro-rata  share of any
debt service paid by the debtor, provide the legal mechanism for the free ride.
Some  debtor  countries  have  tried  to  control  this  type  of  behaviour  by
specifying  that a particular  menu of options  is valid  only if  a sufficient  number of
creditors  subscribe to the deal.  This transfers the burden of ensuring compliance  on
the part of  would-be free riders to  the other members of the London Club  who are
anxious  to conclude  the deal7. Other countries have instead tried to make the menu
more attractive, and thereby minimize the temptation to free ride.
Experience  has  shown  that  the  process  of  designing  a  Brady-type
comprehensive  financing plan is often lengthy and iterative.  The most constructive
negotiating  experiences  have  been  characterized  by  close  and  regular  contact
between a  well-prepared  Debt  Management Team  from the debtor country  and  the
Bank Advisory Committee.
6  In the case of troubled sovereign debt, the term "cheap rider"  is increasingly used
rather than "free rider".  It refers to the same set of banks, but allows for the fact
that they have also sacrificed something in the sense that their existing claims have
not been fully serviced.  Thus, the argument goes, they are trying to get off "cheap"
rather than "free".
7  London Club refers to the community of commercial creditors for a particular debtor.
The Paris Club refers to the country's official creditors (bilateral and multilateral).-12-
VII.  An Illustration  of the "exit or stay in" Choice
Suppose that a debtor faces the following  amortization  profile at end 1991 on
existing obligations of  US$100 million, interest  rate fixed  at  10%, applied to
outstanding  debt stock: (all figures in US$million)
1991  1992  13  1994  1995  1996
Principal
Repayment  40  40  30  10  10  10
Remaining
Debt Stock  100  60  30  20  10  0
Interest
Due  10  6  3  2  1  0
Annual
Debt
Service  50  46  33  22  11  10
Suppose this debt burden is not compatible with the  country's  expected
ability to pay, and the prevailing secondary market price of the country's debt is 27
cents, reflecting the market's expectation regarding the probability of repayment (or
the expected present value of repayment per dollar of outstanding  debt).
The country may present the following  offer to its creditors at year-end  1991:
- A cash buyback at 30 cents, OR
- Repayment  over 17 years with 7 years of grace, at LIBOR+.5%,  AND
New Money equal to 20% of existing exposure, over 15 years, 7 years
grace, at LIBOR+1.5%
It is assumed  that creditors respond to the offer as follows:
US$60  million of outstanding  obligations  are tendered  for Buyback
US$40 million  are rescheduled,  resulting  in
US$8 million  of new  money  obligations.
Following  the buyback of US$60 million, and the addition of new money, the
country's debt stock  has fallen  from US$100  million  to US$48 million.
All menu driven debt reduction agreements are based on the premise that
creditors  differ  in  their  strategy with respect  to  both their  long-term business
interests in LDCs, and the protection of  their existing assets.  Choices are made
based on the individual circumstances  of each bank.  Exit instruments are aimed at
small-exposure  banks with no long-term interest in the country, who are therefore-13-
reluctant to provide new money. Exit through  a cash buyback indirectly benefits the
remaining creditor banks by the future debt service relief it offers to the debtor, and
the higher probability that remaining tlaims will be serviced out of a limited cash
flow.  This is not to say that remaining creditors do not "take a hit", however. The
options are specifically designed so that a priori there is equal burden sharing built
into both.  Thus, the major principle guiding the construction  of a menu is to design
instruments  of similar cost to the debtor but which offer differing values to various
categories of creditors, in order to maximize concessions from them and obtain the
best overall deal.
VIII.  Additional Considerations--Partial  Exit
The basic choice faced by the creditor is  to exit or  lend new money, as
described above. However, in practice, there are some refinements to the total exit
option, which offer creditors the ability to "partially exit".  Creditors choosing a
partial exi. option do not lend any new money.  They receive enhancements and
either give up a share of the principal or they accept lower interest payments.  One
may ask, if the debt service streams under all options offered to creditors are in any
case equivalent in net present value terms 8, why would some banks choose partial
rather than complete exit?  The answer is that such banks are unable to afford the
extremes of either a complete exit or a new money commitment for balance sheet
(accounting), fiscal and regulatory reasons.  This  suggests a need for additional
instruments  which offer partial exit to creditors. Also, a country may not be able to
fund a full buyback and may have to structure a menu to meet its own resource
constraints.
Experience of debt  workouts to date  has in  fact illustrated the  need for
debtors to offer a richer menu of options to creditors than just the buyback and new
money options. Offers to exchange loans for bonds (long term securities) have been
a successful  means of matching:
- the creditors' needs for a partial exit instrument with greater liquidity
than their existing claims, and
- the debtors' need for cash flow relief on debt service.
Partial exit is accomplished  either through:
- sacrificing  the recovery  of full interest payments  on the existing claim,
- or through  the write-off  of a portion  of principal on the existing  claim.
8  Using the applicable discount factor, based on the yield to maturity model.-14-
Reduction of interest or principal as the means of partial exit  will be chosen
largely  based  on  balance  sheet  (accounting)  strategies,  and  fiscal  and  regulatory
constraints of each individual creditor, once the decision to exit has been made.9
In the first case, the debtor offers to exchange existing claims for a long term
security  with a  below  market  interest  rate,  and  a  face  value  equal  to  the  existing
obligation.  This is a par  bond.  The creditor is thus able to exit partially  through  a
stream  of below  market  interest  payments  for e.g  30 years,  while maintaining  the
principal  value intact after the exchange.  The loss accepted  by a creditor  choosing
the par bond is that he has a fixed revenue stream based on a below-market  interest
rate,  while his funding costs  continue to be variable and market linked.  This is the
tradeoff he has chosen in the interest of protecting the face value of the asset, i.e not
having to reduce the amount of debt.
In the second case the debtor offers  to exchange  existing  claims  for  a long
term  security with a market-based  interest rate, but  with a face value  less than that
of the original obligation.  The discount from the original  loan gives this instrument
the name of discount bond,.  In this case the loss absorbed by the creditor consists of
an upfront reduction in face value of his claims, while a market rate is earned on the
reduced principal outstanding.
The bonds essentially  amount to concessional  long term rescheduling.  Both
par  and  discount  bonds  have,  to  date,  generally  been  structured  with  a  bullet
maturity  feature.  This  means  that  the principal  (face  value)  is repaid  in  a  single
installment  upon maturity of the bond, and there is no amortization  schedule.  Both
bonds result in debt service reduction,  so the exit cost  to creditors  is reflected  in a
lower stream of future interest payments:
- the par  bond offers  debt  service  reduction  while  maintaining  constant  a
given amount of debt. and applying a below  market interest rate,  while the
discount bond offers debt service reduction by reducing the amount of debt
and then applying a market interest rate.
Such bonds are often  referred  to as exit  bonds  since they are exempt  from
future  new money requests  by the debtor.  They are also  exempt  from  the sharing
and other restrictive  linking clauses of the syndicated  loan agreements.  This  makes
the  bonds  more  marketable.  Debtor  countries  have  traditionally  serviced  bonds
even  when  they  rescheduled  loans.  The  implicit  seniority  status  of  the  bonds,
however,  is  only  credible  to  the  extent  that  their  relative  amount  remains  low
relative to debt servicing capacity.
There are at least two alternatives  to exit bonds for commercial  banks.  One
is  direct  loan  sale  at  a  discount  in  the  secondary  market;  the  second  one  is
maintenance of the loan on the bank's  books and refusal to participate in future new
lending.  The latter one  is the free rider  case, and it involves trying  to collect  full
9  In practice there  are also  instruments  which combine features  'rom  the par  and
discount  bonds, e.g step up interest rate bonds, front-loaded interest rate bonds, etc.-15-
interest due on outstanding loans without contributing to  the fresh money loans
which provide in part the resources to pay future interest.
IX.  Securitization/Collateralization  of Exit Bonds
In order for creditors to participate in an actual transaction involving exit
bonds, the  bonds must be perceived to  be of a different risk category than the
existing claims. The process of collateralizing  an instrument with another financial
instrument of higher grade (lower risk) is known as securitization.  Creditors are
unlikely to accept a long term discounted bond simply based on the fact that in the
past bonds have always been treated as implicitly senior debt.  The exit bonds must
be collateralized or guaranteed to some extent, both on principal and/or interest, so
the risk associated  with them is no longer pure country  risk.10
For example, the creditor may seek to be assured that the country will be
able to repay the full amount outstanding  in year 30.  The debtor has to incur some
costs in order to provide security for the debt exchange instruments  he is proposing,
in order to add credibility to the "enhanced value" of these instruments.
X.  The Zero Coupon Security
One approach is for the debtor to invest some funds in a high grade security
which will mature in thirty years from now, when he needs the funds to repay the
principal obligations  on his maturing exit bonds.  In fact, he can purchase a security
with a matching maturity date and face value.  The least expensive way for the
debtor to assure that the required funds will be available in year 30 is to purchase a
zero coupon  instrument.  This  instrument does  not pay  out  interest  earnings
annually but reinvests them instead.  If the annual yield on the zero coupon security
is 8.5%, for example, this means that interest will accrue at this rate on the initial
price of the instrument,  and will be reinvested  in the following period. The process
will repeat itself until maturity, when the instrument  will pay out the initial price plus
all the accrued interest over the thirty years. This final sum is the face value of the
zero coupon instrument.  Because zero coupon bonds pay no interest during their
lifetime but return full face value at maturity, such instruments are sold at steep
discounts from face value. In the example, a zero coupon bond with a face value of
US$100  in year 30 can be purchased  today for US$8.65. If the yield is higher,  at 9.5%
for example, the discount in year 1 is even steeper, since more will be earned and
reinvested each period.  Less is therefore required upfront for the same final face
value of US$100. In fact, the cost of a 9.5% zero coupon bond is US$6.57  per US$100
in year 30.
If the debtor had issued a  forty year bond as  an exchange offer to  his
creditors instead,  and therefore his cash requirement was in  year 40,  he could
purchase a forty year zero coupon bond today to cover his future obligation.  For a
10  However, at least two countries have recently proposed uncollateralized long term
bonds as one of their menu options. These  bave not yet been accepted by creditors.-16-
yield of 8.5%, the upfront cost to him would be lower than in the previous example,
because of the greater number  of compounding  periods. The cost of such a bond with
a US$100 face value would be US$3.83. (In practice, no forty year bonds have been
issued, or used as collateral--the  problem in this case, would be to find an issuer of
40 year bonds).
A summary  of upfront costs for a series of US$100 zero coupon instruments
based on different assumptions  about yields and maturities is given below:
8%  9%  10%
20 years  21.46  17.86  14.86
30 years  9.94  7.54  5.73
40 years  4.60  3.18  2.21
XI.  The Role of Zero CoUpon  Instruments  as Principal Collateral
In practice high grade zero coupon securities with matching maturity and
value are held in a trust account as collateral against the principal repayment under
the exit bonds. The debtor is required to purchase the highest grade zero coupon in
a  given  currency and  pledge the  proceeds in  Year Thirty  to  be  used  for the
repayment of principal on the exit bonds it has offered to its creditors.  Such zero
coupon securities could be issued in their respective currencies by the US, French,
German or other OECD treasuries" 1.
It  is  essential  for  creditors  that  the  principal repayment  risk  on  their
exchange bonds be reduced effectively to the risk of the US treasury repaying its
zero coupon bond obligation to the debtor.  Since this is assumed to be essentially
riskless, and furthermore  the zero coupon collateral instrument  is pledged to be used
for the specific  purpose, creditors can be assured that the exchange bond has a lower
uncertainty  and hence a higher value than their existing claims.  From the creditors'
point of view, there is no longer any debtor-country  risk associated with repayment
of principal,  i.e the repayment  is fully defeased.
The investment of funds in a high grade zero coupon instrument is the least
expensive means of assuring the future availability  of funds in terms of upfront costs
to the debtor.  There is also no further cash outflow from the debtor in year 30
related to repayment of principal.  By purchasing as collateral a bond today which
will have the needed value upon maturity, the debtor has effectively "prepaid" his
obligation.
A collateralized debt defeasance scheme involves  a certain "opportunity
cost" for the debtor in that a portion of international  reserves has to be put aside in
I 1 In practice  there are as yet no thirty year  securities  issued  by the German  Treasury.-17-
order to guarantee the principal of the discounted debt.  The relationship between
that cost and ti.e saving on future debt payments determines a "break-even point"
for the country.
It is often asked by observers why this pledging process requires the debtor
to invest funds outside the country, and in effect to "lend its funds for thirty years"
to  an OECD-member treasury.  This is  a  necessary part of  the risk  reduction
process.  By definition, if the debtor invested the funds in a domestic zero coupon
instrument, this would be useless in achieving the objective since it is precisely the
sovereign  risk of the debtor country that creditors  are trying to avoid.
XII.  The Interest Collateral  Account
Annual interest payments  (fixed rate and below market, or variable rate
linked to market) on the exit bonds owed by the country to its creditors will continue
to contain some element of country risk, however.  Most creditors require that the
debtor establish an interest collateral account by depositing cash  or marketable
securities equivalent to a number of interest payments (e.g one or two years' worth)
in an interest collateral  escrow account up front.  Earnings on the resources invested
in the interest collateral account accrue to  the country each year.  The interest
collateral account is thus kept constant at the agreed amount.
The country is then expected to make its regular interest payments from its
own resources year by year.  In case of any interruption in payment, creditors have
access to the interest collateral account until it is depleted, after which time they
may presumably initiate legal proceedings.  It is expected by all parties that the
country will be fully able to honor its interest obligations, and that the collateral
account will not be touched but instead keep on rolling over until the last year of the
instrument,  when it can be used to make the final interest payments. This collateral
account is referred to as the rolling interest guarantee.
XIII.  Illustration  of a Debt and Debt Service Reduction  Operation
A country has US$100 million of outstanding  commercial debt.  It has three
creditors of different nationalities, A (US$60 million), B (US$25 million) and C
(US$15 million).  The current secondary market price of the country's debt is 35
cents although almost no trades are taking place at this price.
The country, which has decided to seek no new money at this point, may
present its creditors with the following  proposal:
--  Cash Buyback at 39 cents per dollar of face value, or
- 30 year Par Bond with 6 percent fixed interest rate, 1 year of interest
payments  coilateralized,  principal  fully collateralized,  or-18-
- 30 year Discount Bond (70 percent of face value) at LIBOR+.5%, 2
years of interest payments  collateralized,  principal fully collateralized.
Creditor A  may  be undercapitalized and  therefore  only  able  to  accept
instruments  which  do not require  a reduction of principal. (Par Bond)
Creditor B may be provisioned  against losses such that it can accept a loss of
up to 30%, but no greater. (Discount  Bond)
Creditor C may consider its exposure to be small enough that it prefers to
"get out" with a 61% upfront loss rather than maintain this debtor on it  "ooaks.
(Cash Buyback)
Under a voluntary market based approach to debt restructuring the country
will  end  up  with  the  allocation of  its  US$100 million  debt  across  the  three
instruments as follows:
Cash Buyback  US$15  million
Par Bond  US$60  million
Discount Bond  US$25  million
After the cash buyback, which retires US$15 million in face value of debt
immediately, the remaining US$85 million will be converted to par and discount
bonds.  A further debt reduction will take place at the time the discount bond is
issued. The US$25 million  of old debt tendered  for that option will be replaced with a
new bond of US$17.5  million face  value (70% of US$25 million). The par bond, as its
name suggests, will be issued for the full amount of US$60 million face value.  The
country therefore moves from a debt stock of US$100 million to US$77.5 million
(60+17.5) which must be serviced over 30 years, and in doing so it uses US$5.85
million of reserves for the buyback (see Section XV).
The debt service relief provided to the country under each of the instruments
may be calculated  by comparing with the original debt service profile, and attributing
the relief proportionally  to each of the instruments. For example, 15/100 or 15% of
the original  debt service obligations  are cancelled  upfront by the cash buyback, etc.
XIV.  Building  the Menu
The basic principle in designing the menu is to tailor instruments so that each
group of creditors will choose what it values the most.  It is important  to note that if
the  country decides  to  follow the  route  of  the  voluntary market  based  menu
approach, it has to ensure that, as long as it has no particular desire to influence
creditors' choices, all of the proposed instruments should offer roughly similar net
present values  of  debt  service relief.  The banks  will  of  course  value these
instruments  differently  from the country and from each other in terms of expected net
present value of payments and other factors, since they each face a diffetrent  set of
conditions and constraints. This is what will ultimately determine the allocation of
eligible debt across the menu items under a voluntary workout.-19-
On the other hand, a country may decide that a particular method of debt
reduction confers greater advantages, e.g the cash buyback, because the country
strongly  prefers immediate  cancellation  of future debt service obligations. This could
be the case if the country felt that a visible, upfront reduction in debt stock would
bring added benefits such as increased investor confidence, reduced inflationary
expectations, repatriation of flight capital, etc.  The country may then wish to price
the cash buyback option more attractively than the other menu items, and thus
deliberately not attempt to establish equivalency  among instruments. This would be
done in order to influence banks' behavior in a manner consistent with its desired
outcome, while still following the market-based approach. The tradeoff here lies in
the known increased upfront costs that will be incurred in offering a higher-priced
buyback, against the unceitain value of the added benefits (e.g increased investor
confidence)  the country is counting  on under this strategy.
XV. The Cost of Financing  the Menu
The country will only be able to offer a choice to its creditors if it knows that
it will be able to finance any given outcome or combination  of exchange instruments
that creditors may end up selecting. The level of creditor participation will in turn
substantially depend on what sort of menu of debt exchange instruments a debtor
can offer in order to retire existing claims. At the same time, the creditors' choice of
exchange instrument  will affect a debtor's upfront cost of funding its debt reduction
plan, since each type of instrument  offered  carries with it a different  type of collateral
requirement.
In order for the deal described in Section XIII to materialize, the country will
have to be able to finance it in the following  amounts:
Cash Buyback  (0.39XUS$15  million)  US$5.85  million
Par Bond
Annual Interest Payments Yr 1-30 (0.06X60)  US$ 3.6 million
Upfront Costs:
Purchase  of US Treasury  to secure 60 millIon  of principal in Year 30
US$ 5.97 million
Interest Escrow Account of 1 year's int. pmt  US$ 3.6 million
Discount Bond  (LIBOR is assumed to be constant at 8%)
Principal  is reduced  from US$25m  to 70% of this, i.e  US$17.5  million
Annual Interest Payments Yr. 1-30  (.085X17.5)  US$1.49  million
Upfront Costs:
Purchase  of collateral  for principal  US$1.74  million
Interest Escrow Account  US$2.9  million-20-
The sum of the upfront costs is (5.85+5.97+3.6+1.74+2.9)  US$20.06 million.
Thereafter, the country's  annual debt service is (1.49+3.6) US$5.09 million.  In
summary,  collateral requirements  are as follows:
Principal  Collateral  Interest Collateral  Total
Par Bond  5.97  3.6  9.57
Discount Bond  1.74  2.9  4.64
Cash Buyback  5.85  n.a  5.85
Total  13.56  6.5  20.06
XVI.  The Role of Multilateral  Institutions
As mentioned earlier, the innovation under the so-called Brady Plan was to
formally include official sector support in financing  packages such as the one shown
above. IBRD and IMF, Japan EXIM, other bilateral governments,  and most recently
the Inter-American  Development Bank have participated to date in helping to meet
eligible Brady countries' financing needs for their debt reduction agreements with
creditors through  loans.  Broad guidelines  used by IBRD and IMF are shown below.
Procedure  for use of  IBRD Resources
IBRD support for debt and debt service reduction (DDSR) is decided on a
case by case basis.  The argument for supporting debt reduction must be linked to
implementation in the deotor country of growth-oriented medium term adjustment
policies in which debt reduction would play a key role in the medium term financing
plan.
Bank support will be decided  after taking into account:
- the strength  of the medium  term adjustment  program;
- the severity of the debt burden;
- the country's track record;
- the scope for voluntary market based operations;
- the medium term financing plan; and
- the potential benefits from Bank support for investment  and growth.
Objectives  of the medium  term program should include measures  to:
- promote domestic  savings and investment;
- encourage direct foreign investment;-21-
- encourage  capital repatriation.
The existence of debt equity swap programs and adherence to MIGA are
seen as useful steps in the investment area.
So-called "set aside funds" would be set aside from the existing lending
program and used to support operations involving significant principal reduction.
This would include cash buybacks,  and purchase of collateral for discount bonds (but
not for par bonds, since there is no principal reduction).
Set-asides will be determined on a case-by-case basis but would involve
either:
- around 25% of a country's adjustment lending program over a three year
period;  or
- around  10%  of its overall lending  program
Set aside funds for debt reduction may be provided through adjustment
operations that contain an appropriate debt reduction program component, or they
may  be provided,  in  exceptional circumstances,  as  a  "stand-alone"  operation,
effectively using resources set aside from future loans.  Significant front-loading
could be considered only when there is strong economic performance and a clear
need in terms of the debt reduction program.
Additional resources of up to 15% of the overall three year lending program
could also be made available. Such additional resources would be used for interest
sUp ort in connection with DDSR.  This would include the establishing of interest
collateral  accounts  for both par and discount bonds.
Procedure  for use of IMF resources
The eligibility requirements  in terms of policy reforms  are very close to those
listed above for IBRD. There must be an ongoing medium term adjustment  program
with a strong element of structural  reform, which is adopted either in the context of
stand-by or extended fund facility arrangements (SBAs or EFFs).
IMF support in the form of set asides for DDSR would be determined on a
case by case basis and would generally  amount to:
25% of access determined on the basis of existing policy under an extended
or stand-by arrangement.
Availability of the set-aside amounts would generally be phased in line with
program performance. Where warranted,  some front-loading  could be considered.-22-
The Fund would be prepared to approve requests for additional resources of
up  to  40% of  a  member's  quota, to  be used  for interest support,  where such
resources would be
- decisive  in facilitating  further cost effective operations  and catalyzing  other
resources, and
- consistent with significant progress towards external viability.
To date, IMF and IBRD have supported the commercial debt workouts of
Mexico, Venezuela  and Uruguav. A nartial buvback was funded for the Philippines
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